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SOCIALIZED RELIGION:
CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC TRUST THEORY
MORTON J. JACKSON*
INTRODUCTION
Socialism is classically defined as public ownership of the
means of production. Socialized medicine, an extension of this con-
cept, implies state ownership and control over the means by which
the healing arts are practiced. California, fertile soil for original and
exotic schemes, has presented the country with socialized religion,
public ownership and control of the means of worship. This feat is
accomplished through an ingenious device called the charitable or
public trust theory. This article will examine the public trust theory
and some of its corollaries, as articulated by California's Attorney
General and applied by its trial courts. The legal basis advanced to
justify the theory will also be analyzed, as well as the principal con-
stitutional inhibitions with which it collides.
I. PUBLIC TRUST THEORY EXAMINED
The public trust theory is a device invented by the Charitable
Trust Section of the California Attorney General's office to facilitate
and legitimate state control of churches. This control is accom-
plished by classifying all churches as public trusts and their officers
as the public's trustees, thus fastening public ownership-and state
control-upon all property and assets purportedly owned by such
churches.
The theory cannot withstand close analysis under charitable
trust law, and the attributes of the theory demonstrate its incom-
patibility with the most basic notions of constitutional principle, to
say nothing of common sense. However, the public trust theory can-
not be dismissed lightly as a mere aberration, for it represents a
further manifestation of the state's historic and inevitable effort to
"dominate the church and use it as an engine for its purposes. '
* Partner in MacDonald, Halsted & Laybourne, Los Angeles, California.
1. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 727 (rev. ed. 1967). Pfeffer's thesis
in whole reads:
Probably ever since the institutions of religion and of secular powers
were recognized as separate and distinct in human history, the two forces
have competed for and struggled over human destiny. In this struggle the
church has sought to dominate the state and use it as an engine for its
purposes, and the state has sought to dominate the church and use it as
an engine for its purposes.
Jackson: Socialized Religion: California's Public Trust Theory
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
186 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
The first premise underlying the public trust theory is that
property accumulated by California churches from contributions is
really owned by all residents of California. For example, even
though a deed to a church sanctuary shows the church as the owner,
the church is merely a custodian of the property-entitled to safe-
guard the sanctuary. The people of the State of California are enti-
tled to control the sanctuary's use because they are its beneficial
owners, regardless of whether any of them contributed to the sanc-
tuary's building or even subscribe to the beliefs of the contributors.2
Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Tapper explained the state's
theory to members of the Worldwide Church of God in these words:
The law is very protective of institutions such as
yours, on the theory that the institution itself and all of
those who run the institution are standing in a position of
2. State's Second Amended Complaint, State v. Worldwide Church of God,
Inc., No. C267607 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 2, 1979), mandamus denied, Worldwide
Church of God v. Superior Court, No. 31091 (Cal. Mar. 22, 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
883 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 914, 100 S. Ct. 1846 (1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987,
100 S. Ct. 2974 (1980) (dismissed from L.A. Super. Ct., Oct. 16, 1980) [hereinafter cited
as Second Amended Complaint].
The complaint formally alleges that the church and its associated college and
foundation hold their assets "as trustees subject to supervision by the Attorney
General." It goes on to state that beneficial ownership of these assets resides with the
public, and then adds this remarkable language: "None of the defendants [the Church,
the College, and the Foundation] has or may legally have any proprietary interest in...
[their] . . . assets and property . . . nor in their books and records."
In arguing before the superior court in the same case, Special Deputy Attorney
General Hillel Chodos averred:
Every other party who comes before the court has some claim to its own
property and has some right to resist intervention by the court, But for
700 years, Your Honor, it has been the law in England and America that
charitable funds are public funds. They are perpetually in the custody of
the court. The court is the ultimate custodian of all church funds.
Proceedings before Judge Title, at 7-8 (Jan. 10, 1979), State v. Worldwide Church of
God, Inc. (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Title hearing, Jan. 10, 1979].
Earlier, when seeking to persuade Judge Pacht to issue the initial ex parte
receivership order, Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Tapper blandly assured the
court that "the [Church] records we are talking about are public records, just as the
assets . .. are also public assets." Chodos then went on to add that the court need not
be concerned that it might be interfering with someone's rights, since no private inter-
ests were involved, hence no private rights would be transgressed.
Proceedings before Judge Pacht, at 7-9 (Jan. 2, 1979), State v. Worldwide Church of
God, Inc. [hereinafter cited as Pacht hearing]. See also, Worthing, The State Takes
Over A Church, 446 ANNALS 136 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Worthing]; Kelley, A
Church in Receivership: California's Unique Theory of Church and State, 97 CHRISTIAN
CENTURY 669 (June 18-25, 1980).
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trust, the property being truly owned not by the institu-
tion or individuals, but rather the people of California.'
As Mr. Tapper's statement indicates, public ownership is only one of
two defining characteristics of the theory. The other characteristic
is that churches and their officers are "trustees" over property
ostensibly belonging to the church, but actually held in a public
trust.
"Trust" can be used as a term of art defined by centuries of
use in England and the United States, and the State of California
uses the term in this legal sense. The route by which it arrives at
this use of the term is sweepingly simplistic. The state simply as-
serts that all churches are charitable organizations, that all char-
itable organizations are public trusts and therefore that every
church becomes, ipso facto, a public trust, accountable to the state
as the guardian of the public interest. This assertion gives rise to a
number of startling corollaries, all of which the state seeks to apply
to all churches. The following corollaries have been successfully
claimed and applied.'
1. The State Controls and Supervises the Use of All
Church Assets and May Punish Those Who Attempt
to Evade State-Mandated Restrictions.
The State of California has recently claimed the right to con-
trol the use of all church property of the Synanon Foundation 5 and
the Worldwide Church of God.' In litigation with the Synanon Foun-
dation, a deputy attorney general threatened to seek an order from
the judicial branch of the state that would prohibit Synanon Founda-
tion from compensating certain employees. The state claimed that
payment of the compensation should be enjoined because it was "ex-
3. Speech by Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Tapper to members and
employees of the Worldwide Church of God, in Pasadena, California (Jan. 4, 1979).
4. While the articulation of the doctrine in its full reach is relatively recent,
the basic concept was asserted by California's Attorney General as early as 1947. The
State's complaint in People v. Christ's Church of the Golden Rule, 79 Cal. App. 2d 858,
859, 181 P.2d 49, 50 (1947), alleged that the Church "was a nonprofit California corpora-
tion formed for public, religious and charitable purposes, owning assets in excess of
$3,000,000, and having no valid franchise to hold property other than as a public,
charitable trust" (emphasis added). The court did not comment on the validity of this
assertion.
5. See Synanon Foundation, Inc. v. California, Civil No. S-79-664-PCW (E.D.
Cal.), application for stay of order denied, 444 U.S. 1307 (1979).
6. State v. Worldwide Church of God, Inc., No. C267607 (L.A. Super. Ct., fil-
ed Jan. 2, 1979).
1981]
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cessive, unreasonable and without legal justification."7 No claim was
made that the compensation had not been duly authorized by the
church or that the recipient was not an employee.
In litigation against the Worldwide Church of God, the state
obtained control over the entire property and activities of that
church in the form of a state-imposed and supervised receivership.
One of the deputy receivers explained the state's position to church
members as follows:
The law is that the [state-appointed] receiver owns all the
property, assets and records of the Worldwide Church of
God, Inc. and Ambassador College, Inc. He is in posses-
sion of them. The law gives him the right to do with them
as he sees fit .... Anyone who defies the orders is in con-
tempt of court . . . can be put in jail for his contempt.
[T]he receiver is your boss now who has the power to hire
and fire, to dispose of all church property, I want to em-
phasize this, as he sees fit in his judgment. Some people
have not appreciated the extent of the receiver's power.
He owns everything. It is his property now.8
Not only did the state empower the receiver to control and super-
vise the use of all church property, but also to exercise the power to
rescind church decisions that he viewed as unwise or unreasonable:
"[W]e wish to know whether millions of dollars in expenses ... had a
reasonable relationship to Church purposes."9 Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Tapper, referring to the Worldwide Church of God and affil-
iated corporations, stated that the state was to decide "whether
they're spreading the Word as much as they're spreading the
money."10
7. Proposed Complaint for restitution, damages, surcharge of trustees, ap-
pointment of a successor trustee, enforcement of a charitable trust, and for injunctive
and other equitable relief, State of California v. Dederich. The filing of this complaint
was enjoined by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
in Synanon Foundation, Inc. v. California, Civil No. S-79-664-PCW.
8. Statement by Deputy State Receiver Raphael Chodos to church members
and employees in Pasadena, California, at 1-3 (Jan. 4, 1979). The receiver, ex-Judge
Steven Weisman, confirmed these views in the course of his remarks later in the same
meeting.
9. State's Response to Application for Stay of Receivership at 8, State v.
Worldwide Church of God, Inc., No. C267607 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 2, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Response to Application for Stay].
10. Interview with Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Tapper, KNBC, Los
Angeles, at 3 (Jan. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Tapper interview].
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2. The State Can Appropriate Church Funds to Pay the
Salaries and Expenses of the State's Supervisors and
Investigators.
In the Worldwide Church of God litigation, the judicial branch
of the State of California authorized the state-appointed receiver to
appropriate church funds to cover the salaries and expenses nec-
essary for state supervision and investigation of the church:
Now the receiver is also empowered to hire and employ
and retain his own counsel, accountants and any other
personnel, employees which he deems necessary to assist
him in the discharge of his duties under this order.
He is authorized to pay to them reasonable compensation
out of the funds and assets of the church. ... "
In addition, the Court authorized the appropriation of church funds
to pay the surety bond expenses of the state's receiver. 2 In this
case alone, the state has claimed the right to appropriate more than
$250,000 for these expenditures, and the church has been ordered to
pay. Special Deputy Attorney General Hillel Chodos, the private at-
torney who persuaded the state to file the action and was prom-
inently active in its early weeks, presented the church with an addi-
tional bill for over $100,000 in fees and costs for the "services" of his
office. This claim was not immediately allowed and is presently on
appeal.
3. The State May Remove Church Leaders If It Has the
Slightest Suspicion That They Are Not Following
State Dictates.
A representative of the state, Deputy Attorney General
Chodos, argued before the Los Angeles Superior Court that:
[T]here are presently trustees that have been allowed to
manage the charitable fund on a day-to-day basis .... We
believe that essentially those trustees serve at the court's
pleasure and may be replaced ..
The church, as a charitable trust, has no interest to pro-
tect here . . . it is the court's funds and the court may
11. Hearing before Judge Title, at 394 (Jan. 12, 1979), State v. Worldwide
Church of God, Inc., No. C267607 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 2, 1979).
12. Pacht hearing, supra note 2, at 12.
13. Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added).
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remove and replace and substitute trustees at its pleas-
ure.
If there is the slightest hint or suspicion . .. of wrong-
doing, let alone proof positive or proof by preponderance,
it is the court's duty, as I understand it, to see to it there
is a worthy trustee installed."
The installation of a "worthy trustee" entails removal of the present
"trustee," which means removal of the church leaders who were se-
lected by the church membership or hierarchy. 5 Moreover, the state
uses the term "wrongdoing" to include actions that the state deter-
mines, after the fact, to have been unreasonable, unwise, or simply
inappropriate, regardless of whether these actions involved any
actual or attempted deception or fraud. "Wrongdoing" includes, for
example, incurring travel expenses deemed by the state to be "ex-
cessive," what the state refers to as "civil" fraud. The cumulative
impact is that the state claims the power to remove church officials
for failure to abide by state guidelines on private church expendi-
tures.
4. Churches Have No Right to the Due Process of Law
Guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
The church's lack of due process protection came to light in the
Worldwide Church of God litigation when the state sought to take
control of the church, two related nonprofit corporations and several
unrelated for-profit corporations. Since the relief sought by the state
obviously involved the impairment of a property interest, the due
process clause of the United States Constitution would ordinarily re-
quire that the these parties be given notice and a hearing prior to
such action. The state successfully argued that the due process re-
quirements did not apply to the church or its related non-profit cor-
porations because the property was not owned by them but was
owned by the people of the State of California. Thus, there was no
deprivation of a private property interest. The state's lawyer
argued:
First of all, I recognize that any request for an ex parte
receiver, without notice, has to be viewed against a strong
presumption that it is an emergency measure to be used
with great caution.
14. Title hearing, Jan. 10, 1979, supra note 2, at 8-9 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 9.
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I would suggest to you, however, that at least insofar as
pertains to the Worldwide Church of God, Inc., Ambassa-
dor College, Inc., and Ambassador International Cultural
Foundation, Inc., that the usual principles are not appli-
cable.
[A] shorthand way of describing the law applicable* to
.the[se] corporations . . . is that their property always and
ultimately rests in the court's custody and they are
always ultimately subject to the supervision of the court
on the application of an Attorney General. In effect, there
are no private interests. The court is not taking some-
thing away from somebody or interfering with anyone's
private rights."6
[Flurthermore, and most important, I want to emphasize
that the usual impediment to granting ex parte relief does
not exist here. Normally, in a private property situation
where you grant ex parte relief, the court is put in a posi-
tion of attempting to interfere with someone's rights and
to stop people from doing things that they would other-
wise do with their own property and maybe create great
havoc to private interests that have not had an opportun-
ity to be heard. . . . In this case, however, there are no
private transactions.7
The court expressly accepted this reasoning. It issued an order
dispossessing the church and its nonprofit corporation codefendants
and imposed a receiver to take over the management of their activi-
ties without notice or hearing to these parties. However, the court
refused to make a similar order with respect to the co-defendant for-
profit corporations, since these were under private ownership and
were thus entitled to due process!
The state has consistently argued that churches, as public
trusts, are not entitled to any constitutional or other privileges vis-
a-vis the investigative and supervisory powers of the state." The
16. Pacht hearing, supra note 2, at 3 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 8.
18. E.g., The Attorney General of the State of California and his
deputies have not only the power, but the duty, at any time, to in-
vestigate all the books and records, 100% of the books and records, of
any charitable, religious or educational organization because . . . [the
organization] derives its position, its existence, from the State of Califor-
19811
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state has also successfully argued that a public trust and hence a
church or any of its officers or employees, is not entitled to fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
Church premises are thus subject to unannounced entry at any time,
and books, records, papers, and property are subject to unlimited
scrutiny or even seizure and asportation at the discretion of the at-
torney general. This, of course, is precisely what occurred in the in-
itial "raid" upon the Worldwide Church of God.
In justification of this startling proposition, the attorney
general argued that churches and their officers, as trustees, are not
entitled to any expectation of privacy with respect to property,
records, or papers vis-a-vis the beneficiaries of the trust; that is, the
public or its representative in the person of the state attorney gen-
eral. Hence, the fourth amendment simply does not apply to church-
es or their officers. Further to buttress this argument, the attorney
general likened churches to certain heavily regulated industries,
such as the alcohol and firearms industries, with respect to which
the Supreme Court has enunciated an exception to fourth amend-
ment strictures.19
5. Churches Have No Right to Defend Themselves
Against the State, Nor to Retain Counsel of Their
Own Choosing.
The state strenuously argued, in the Worldwide Church of God
case, that a church, as a public trust, has no private rights to be pro-
tected and therefore no basis for resisting the "protective" interven-
tion of the court or the attorney general. Since church leaders, as
"trustees," also have no interest, they have no standing either to
resist on behalf of the church or to defend its interests. Church
leaders might even be in violation of their trust if they spend church
funds to obtain counsel, since the church is not entitled to counsel
other than the court itself or, perhaps, such counsel as might be ap-
pointed by a court-appointed receiver.
nia. Now those records do not belong.., to Mr. Armstrong. There are no
privileges, constitutional or otherwise, of a charitable foundation against
investigation by the Attorney General.
Proceedings before Judge Foster, at 7 (Jan. 8, 1979), State v. Worldwide Church of God,
Inc., No. C267607 (L.A. Super. Ct., Jan. 2, 1979) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
Foster hearing]. See also, Worthing, supra note 2.
19. State's Opposition to Motion for Return of Property Illegally Obtained at
18-19, State v. Worldwide Church of God, Inc., No. C267607 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Jan.
2, 1979).
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The charitable fund is the ...subject matter of this pro-
ceeding. It isn't a party in the usual sense. It is in Your
Honor's safekeeping. It has no interest to protect against
the court. The Church as a charitable trust has no interest
to protect here.
It is Your Honor's responsibility to do whatever needs to
be done to preserve it . . . and protect the assets and
records, and no one has any basis to resist that interven-
tion.
I am saying if there is any interest of the Church that
needs representation before you, the receiver should
select that counsel. That counsel should be briefed to
come and raise whatever arguments have to be presented
for the Church, and it should be paid out of the Church
fund upon approval by the Court after a proper applica-
tion.
What I am suggesting is this Church doesn't need a
lawyer to help this Court protect its assets.
I don't think the Church has a single interest that needs
counsel before Your Honor. In my view, the Church ought
to welcome the supervision of the Court."
When the Worldwide Church of God expended $50,000 in attor-
ney's fees to defend itself from the state's attack, the state's
lawyers immediately sought an order from a state court requiring
the attorneys to return their fees and to terminate their representa-
tion of the church. "[The church's attorney] is not allowed, Your
Honor, to represent the church, or to be paid out of church funds,
certainly not in advance of court approval."2 1
The state also requested the court to place the entire Worldwide
Church of God under state control in order to prevent expenditures
perceived by the state as extravagant or excessive. A specific "ex-
travagance" cited by the state as justification for state control was
the expenditure by the church to defend itself from the state's at-
tack.'
20. Title hearing, supra note 2, at 8-13 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 6-9 (emphasis added).
22. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at §§ 33-34. The same docu-
1981]
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6. The State Determines How Churches Are to Be
Governed.
The state claims that since churches are organized and hold
their property for the benefit of all the people of the State of Cali-
fornia, churches cannot allow a particular individual or group of indi-
viduals to control the church's activities. The church members must
have democratic control, regardless of church doctrine on matters of
polity. Hierarchical churches, such as the Roman Catholic Church,
believe, as a matter of religious doctrine, that the church should be
governed by the hierarchy and specifically reject congregational
control. The state, however, has sought to compel the Worldwide
Church of God, an hierarchical church, to govern itself democratical-
ly, despite contrary church doctrine. Deputy Attorney General Tap-
per explained the state's objectives to church employees in this
manner:
It is our understanding that for many years these institu-
tions have been run rather autocratically. California law
provides that there should be opportunities for meetings
of the members of a non-profit organization; and that
there should in connection with these meetings be oppor-
tunities for members to express their will through select-
ing the people who have [sic] the institution .... [the State]
has asked that at some appropriate time, procedures . . .
will be done [sic] by the court-an opportunity to put the
institution back on a more traditional footing.23
Although the state has yet to disclose exactly what type of
democracy it seeks to impose on the Worldwide Church of God, the
state's present complaint seeks to have the court remove all finan-
cial control from the church's ecclesiastical hierarchy and place it in
the hands of a democratically selected board of trustees. The state's
original complaint was even more blunt. The complaint requested
the court to abolish the church's hierarchical structure altogether
and to oversee the selection of new church leaders through the
medium of court-supervised elections.24
ment seeks to have the court remove church leaders simply because they resisted the
state's incursion, i.e., defended against it in court. Id. at §§ 17-20.
23. Remarks by Receiver Steven Weisman and Deputy Attorney General
Tapper, in Pasadena, California (Jan. 4, 1979).
24. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at §§ 25-26; Original Complaint
at §§ 11-13 and Prayer at § 2, State v. Worldwide Church of God, Inc., No. C267607
(L.A. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 2, 1979).
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7. The State Can Examine and Physically Take All
Church Records Regardless of the Chilling Effect This
Might Have on Membership and Participation.
The state has commenced actions against Faith Center and the
Worldwide Church of God to compel these corporations to allow the
state to scrutinize their records. In each case the state has asserted
that the church has no right to oppose state scrutiny because the
records are public documents. In the Worldwide Church of God liti-
gation, the state's second amended complaint stated: "None of the
defendants has or may legally have any proprietary interest in the
assets and properties of the Church, the College, or the Foundation,
nor in their books and records.... [TJhe [Church's] records ... are
public records, just as the assets are also public assets."25 Ultimately
the state court granted the attorney general full possession and con-
trol over all church records."
The state successfully argued that the state and its attorney
general "have not only the power, but the duty, at any time to in-
vestigate all the books and records, 100% of the books and records
of any charitable, religious or educational organization" since such
organizations derive their very existence from the state and their
records, in any event, do not belong to them. Further, the state
argued, "there are no privileges, constitutional or otherwise, of a
charitable foundation against investigation by the attorney
general. 2 7
8. Church Members Have No Right to Protect Their
Church or Direct How Their Contributions Should Be
Spent.
While, on the one hand, the state contends that churches must
be democratically run, and that members must, by law, elect church
leaders, the state on the other hand insists that church members are
without the right or power to say how their contributions shall be
spent and have no standing to intervene or otherwise defend their
25. Pacht hearing, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis added).
26. Title hearing, supra note 9, at 395 ("The [state] receiver shall have posses-
sion and control of all the books and records of the Church.").
27. Foster hearing, supra note 16, at 8. A similar order was made in the Faith
Center case, in response to identical arguments and recently was upheld by the Second
Appellate District of California's Court of Appeal in an opinion marked "Not to Be
Published." Younger v. Faith Center, Inc., No. 56574 (Ct. App. 1980). It is, to our
knowledge, the first appellate court to do so. It is perhaps revealing that the opinion
was not certified for publication.
1981]
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church against action taken by the attorney general. The public
trust theory bars them from any interest or right in the subject of
the trust which they allegedly have created.
Under the law, once people donate money to a charitable
organization, they no longer have standing to direct how
it is to be used. It must be used in accordance with the
laws of the State of California. And under those laws,
although the property is held by the charitable organiza-
tion, it is held for the benefit of the public at large.'
The California trial court seems to agree. In the Worldwide
Church of God case, when counsel for the church argued that the
state, whether on its own behalf or ostensibly on behalf of six dissi-
dent former members, should not be permitted to overrule the wish-
es of the 100,000 members in good standing, the court replied,
"Their wishes are immaterial, counsel."
Furthermore, when an organization representing the interests
of the church's members sought to intervene in the Worldwide
Church of God case, an application that would have received routine
approval in virtually any other situation, the state furiously resisted
the attempt, and the court obligingly barred the group from enter-
ing the litigation on the ground that they had no standing."
The state argued in its response to application by the church
for a stay of the receivership:
The ... [State] ... initially filed suit to protect the assets
of the [Worldwide Church of God] and . . . related chari-
table corporations. . . . It was brought by the Attorney
General as the only party, other than the [Church and its
directors] having the legal standing to do so.31
9. The People of the State of California Own and Control
All Property. of Churches Incorporated in California,
Even If No California Citizen Has Ever Contributed to
the Church.
The state has contended "[tj the extent [churches] have col-
lected funds through a California charitable corporation, those funds
28. Tapper interview, supra note 8, at 3.
29. Hearing before Judge Title, at 14 (Feb. 13, 1979), State v. Worldwide
Church of God, Inc., No. C267607 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 2, 1979).
30. Proceedings before Judge Weil, at 80 (Feb. 20, 1979) State v. Worldwide
Church of God, Inc., No. C267607 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 2, 1979).
31. Response to Application for Stay, supra note 7, at 1 (emphasis added).
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are impressed with a trust over which Your Honor is the
supervisor."3 It must come as a shock to church contributors and
members who reside outside California to learn that their contribu-
tions are now owned by strangers, "the property being truly owned,
not by the institution or individuals, but rather, the people of
California."33
The state's receiver, in Worldwide Church of God, sent a
mailgram to all of the church's ministers around the world instruct-
ing the ministers and their congregants (ninety percent of whom re-
side outside of California) that they were not permitted to send
funds or contributions to anyone except him. 4
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST REGULATORY SCHEME
AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS
Each facet of the public trust theory raises serious constitu-
tional questions. The most obvious infringements are of the religion
clauses of the first amendment. However, numerous other guar-
antees have been vitiated by some of the theory's many corollaries. 8
The first amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The United States
Supreme Court has held that this provision restricts not only the
federal legislature, but also restricts state governments.3 ' The regu-
latory scheme created by the State of California is prohibited by
both the free exercise and the establishment clauses of the first
amendment.
At the most obvious level, the establishment clause initially
was intended to prevent the federal government, and now also state
32. Title hearing, supra note 2, at 10.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Brief for Petitioner, app. D, at 9, 444 U.S. 883 (1979).
35. See text accompanying notes 36-45 infra.
36. These guarantees include the prohibition on uncompensated takings by
the appropriation of church monies to fund the regulatory scheme; the due process
clause by the claim that churches have no private interests; the contract clause by the
impairment and confiscation of private property interests and denial of standing to
resist regulation despite the California Corporation Code grants of power; the search
and seizure and freedom of association guarantees by the conversion of church records
into public records; and the due process and commerce clauses by extraterritorial
regulation. See also Sharon Worthing's thoughtful exploration of these problems in
Worthing, supra note 2.
37. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause).
1981]
Jackson: Socialized Religion: California's Public Trust Theory
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
198 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.16
governments, from creating an entity similar to the Anglican
Church, which was controlled and sanctioned by the Crown and par-
ticipated in secular government by functioning as an ecclesiastical
court. These characteristics of the Crown's relationship with the
Anglican Church have reappeared, in California, under the public
trust regulatory scheme. The attorney general becomes the inspect-
or general of religion through whom the State of California controls
the day-to-day activities of regulated churches, determining which
expenditures are consistent with corporate purpose (the church's
mission) and compatible with "trust" principles (the state's percep-
tion of religion). This control extends to approving or removing
church leaders, officers, and employees. State controlled and regu-
lated churches must be perceived by the public as bearing the
state's seal of approval for trustworthiness and honesty. Finally,
state officials placed in control of churches blur the distinction be-
tween the two realms by functioning as both state and church em-
ployees, much as the priests who were ecclesiastical court judges in
eighteenth century England.
Prior to the advent of California's regulatory scheme, no
governmental entity in the history of this country had ever attempt-
ed to wrest physical control of a church from the church members
and ecclesiastical officers. Thus, no American court has ever ad-
dressed a violation of the establishment clause rising to this magni-
tude. However, the standards developed by the United States Su-
preme Court to test the limits of mere governmental assistance to
churches also establish the patent unconstitutionality of California's
scheme.
In determining whether a state action passes muster under the
establishment clause, the United States Supreme Court has required
that the action have a secular purpose, principal or primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and no tendency to fos-
ter excessive entanglement of the state with religion.' As with any
state action, the public trust regulatory scheme arguably has some
secular purpose. However, the scheme undeniably has a principal or
primary effect that advances the interests of those churches that
might welcome state regulation and inhibits the spiritual life of any
church unwilling to bear the yoke of state regulation. Furthermore,
the public trust regulatory scheme totally entangles the state with
the regulated church. Federal court decisions have prohibited Na-
38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970).
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tional Labor Relations Board examination of parochial school mo-
tives for labor relations practices, 9 state agency inspection of
parochial school records to determine which expenditures were sec-
ular, ° and state agency inspection of parochial school records to
ascertain causes of increases in educational expenses." Since the
public trust regulatory scheme obviously entails examination of fi-
nancial records, motives and much more, it goes well beyond the
state actions previously declared unconstitutional because of exces-
sive entanglement of the state with religion.
The California public trust regulatory scheme prohibits the
free exercise of religion in mandating democratic church govern-
ments, allowing state officials to remove ministers and ecclesiastical
officers from their offices, and requiring state approval of religious
expenditures. The constitutional restriction on laws and state ac-
tions inhibiting the free exercise of religion absolutely prohibits any
state law that attempts to regulate religious beliefs and requires a
compelling state justification for any law that inhibits actions
motivated by religious beliefs.'2 In addition, the Constitution re-
quires any inhibiting law to cause the least possible inhibition con-
sistent with recognition of the state's compelling interest.4
The regulatory scheme's mandate of democratic church gov-
ernments, despite doctrinal requirements of hierarchical polity in
churches such as the Roman Catholic Church, as a regulation of be-
lief, is absolutely forbidden by the free exercise clause. The Su-
preme Court has interpreted this clause to protect the "power [of
churches] to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine.""
The ejection of ecclesiastical officers and ministers is also pro-
hibited by the Constitution since the free exercise clause has been
interpreted to forbid state courts from removing church officials, ex-
cept where it is shown that the church's own procedures were vio-
lated. Removal for failure to conform to state notions of proper offi-
cial conduct, however, would empower the state to regulate church
39. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502-04 (1979).
40. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 621-22.
° 41. Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 1979).
42. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
43. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
44. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (emphasis
added).
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activity completely since the churches rhay only act through their
employees. Obviously, the Constitution forbids total state regula-
tion. 5
State control over church expenditures is often justified as inci-
dent to state control of solicitation for contributions. The state inter-
est advanced is usually the protection of the general public from
fraud. The state asserts that control over church expenditures is
necessary to ensure that these contributions are used for religious
purposes. This state interest, while plausible, seldom is deemed suf-
ficiently compelling and, in any event, does not justify the public
trust regulatory scheme. Most churches do not engage in public so-
licitation. Even if church funds were not expended for religious pur-
poses, there would be no deception of the public, and consequently
no state or public interest in the prevention of deception. For those
few churches that do publicly solicit for funds, there may be a
strong state interest. However, all-encompassing regulation still
violates the Constitution because it is not the least drastic means
for protecting this state interest. The federal courts repeatedly have
held that prevention of fraud in solicitation may be achieved
through criminal prosecution with much less inhibition of religious
freedom than is entailed in comprehensive regulatory schemes."6
III. ARE CHURCHES CHARITABLE OR PUBLIC TRUSTS?
A public or charitable trust must be both exclusively be-
nevolent and exclusively for the benefit of the public. Regrettably,
these two separate requirements have never been set forth together
in the cases. The result is a plethora of confusion. Since it is well
documented that, in law, churches always have only benevolent pur-
poses, the only and ultimate question is whether they allow for any
private interests or benefits. If so, a church cannot be a public or
charitable trust-what is commonly called a "charity" or a "public
charitable organization."
Some courts have stated that churches hold their assets "in
trust for their members," by which they mean no more than that
churches are limited by their own corporate powers.'7 Other courts
45. Id. at 107-08.
46. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667, 669
(7th Cir. 1979); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 306.
47. See Wilson v. Hinkle, 67 Cal. App. 3d 506, 511, 136 Cal. Rptr. 731, 735
(1977); Metropolitan Baptist Church v. Younger, 48 Cal. App. 3d 850, 856-57, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 899, 903 (1975).
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have said that churches hold their assets in trust for their members
or for the mother church or for the benefit and use of a certain
religious belief 4 8-statements made in the limited context of internal
disputes over which religious faction in a schism has the right to
church assets. All such statements are simply irrelevant to the issue
at hand.
Any court applying Anglo-American law that ever implied that
a church was a charitable trust or treated it as if it were a char-
itable trust shifted the definition of the word "charitable" to mean
"benevolent" and thereby begged the ultimate question whether a
church has a substantial private purpose. These cases cannot be
relied on to prove that churches are strictly public.
A principal purpose of all churches is to minister to the
spiritual needs of their members, congregants, or adherents. Thus,
all churches have a substantial private purpose and cannot be deem-
ed "charitable" in the full legal sense. Therefore, they cannot be
public or charitable trusts. Nor can churches be deemed public
trusts by forming a public class out of church membership. Failing
to discriminate between church members and the public does vio-
lence to law, language and the Constitution.
A. The Statutory Law
The weaknesses in the arguments for imposing a public trust
on a church are many and striking. Unfortunately the confusing and
ambiguous terminology of the law of charitable trusts lends itself to
sophistry. At the start, the sole basis for the attorney general's in-
trusion into church affairs was founded on former Corporations
Code § 9505."1 Enacted in 1905, the section deals with public chari-
table trusts and, in its original form, gives the attorney general
broad supervisory power over such trusts. Churches are not specifi-
cally mentioned in the statute, but the attorney general argues that
the legislature intended, or must have intended, to include churches.
48. Id.
49. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9505 (West Supp. 1979)(repealed 1980).
A nonprofit corporation which holds property subject to any public or
charitable trust is subject at all times to examination by the Attorney
General, on behalf of the State, to ascertain the condition of its affairs
and to what extent, if at all, it may fail to comply with trusts which it has
assumed or may depart from the general purposes for which it was form-
ed. In case of any such failure or departure the Attorney General shall in-
stitute, in the name of the State, the proceedings necessary to correct the
noncompliance or departure.
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Common sense dictates that if the legislature thought it was dealing
with churches when it enacted § 9505, there would at least have
been a difference of opinion on such an important issue, meriting, if
not different treatment for churches, at least a specific reference.
Indeed, when the legislature enacted the Nonprofit Corporations
Law in 1979, it expressly grappled with the specific question of the
attorney general's authority with respect to churches. The legisla-
ture accorded churches favored treatment and less stringent stan-
dards than those applicable to public benefit corporations, as well as
greater protection from unwarranted attorney general intrusion
than is received by charities. 50 The logical inference is that the
legislature did not intend former § 9505 to have any application to
churches, except perhaps when a church had accepted special assets
under an express public trust.
Any argument to the contrary ignores the existence of a sec-
ond statute, the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable
Purposes Act.' This statute specifically states that it does not apply
to churches, even though it does apply "to all charitable corpora-
tions and trustees holding property for charitable purposes over
which the State or the Attorney General has enforcement or super-
visory powers.1 52 The legislature clearly expressed the view that a
church taken as a whole is not a charitable trust and should not be
held to charitable trust standards even as to those express chari-
table public trusts they do accept.
It was pointed out that if § 9505 was the source of the attorney
general's authority over churches, then the legislature acted in
violation of the principle of equal protection by favoring the Catholic
Church. By its terms, § 9505 gives the attorney general authority
only over nonprofit corporations that hold property subject to a
public or charitable trust. Thus, those churches organized as non-
50. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230 (West Supp. 1981). Section 9230 was recently
amended out of a concern for infringment on the free exercise of religion. Ch. 1324,
1980 Cal. Stats. 5082 (1980). This expression of legislative will prompted the California
attorney general to dismiss the action against the Worldwide Church of God. As
amended, § 9230 prohibits the attorney general from bringing actions against religious
corporations unless there has been a public solicitation and fraud is suspected.
However, § 9230(d) makes it clear that the charitable trust theory remains a viable
theory where fraud is alleged. See Abbott and Kornblum, The Jurisdiction of the At-
torney General Over Corporate Fiduciaries Under the New California Nonprofit Cor-
poration Law, 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 753, 789-90 (1979); Note, Receivers, Churches and Non-
profit Corporations: A First Amendment Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 175, 186 n.82 (1980).
51. CAL. GOTT CODE § 12580 et seq. (1980).
52. Id. at § 12581.
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profit corporations would fall under the attorney general's author-
ity. Catholic dioceses, however, are normally organized as corpora-
tions sole and there is no provision similar to § 9505 dealing with
corporations sole.58 Thus the attorney general would have no author-
ity over the Catholic Church. However, the attorney general did not
concede the lack of authority. Instead, he asserted for the first time
that he was exercising his inherent powers under the common law
of England.
B. The Common Law
From the time of Edward the Confessor to the revolt of the
American Colonies, the principal charities were those of a religious
nature. Church activity-of an established, non-hierarchical, non-
superstitious variety-was considered the highest form of charity.
Prior to the fifteenth century, religious corporations usually held
their property in frankalmoign tenure, free of most feudal burdens.
Property also could be devoted to charitable purposes by conveying
to individuals to the use of religious organizations. The obligations
of the feoffee (trustee) in these cases were honorary obligations,
unenforceable in the courts. However, in 1391 Parliament extended
the mortmain statutes (causing forfeiture of church lands to the
crown) to include such conveyances.'
In the early fifteenth century, the chancellor first began to
issue subpoenas for the enforcement of charitable uses, and, in 1601,
the enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses provided a new
method for the enforcement of charitable trusts. The statute con-
ferred authority upon the chancellor to appoint commissioners from
time to time to inquire into any abuses of charitable bequests or
donations. The statute expressly made the "bishop of every several
diocese" a commissioner.5 Though trusts for religious purposes in-
tentionally were omitted from the statute, and therefore from the
jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioners, from 1639 the courts in
England upheld trusts to promote the established religion as valid
charitable trusts. Such a trust would not fail for want of a definite
beneficiary or for violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Only
gradually did the English courts come to uphold trusts for other
religions as charitable trusts. In 1754, a Jewish testator left money
53. Former CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 10000-09.
54. IV A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348.2 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
SCOTT].
55. Id. at n.7.
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for instructing people in the Jewish religion." The court held that
the trust was illegal, but that under the cy pres doctrine the king
might apply the fund to other charitable purposes. Similar disa-
bilities of Protestant dissenters were lifted by the Toleration Act of
1688 and succeeding statutes. Gradually, this toleration was ex-
tended by upholding trusts for the promotion of Roman Catholicism
in 1834, Judaism in 1837, and Unitarianism in 1842."'
From the time of the Statute of Charitable Uses, the attorney
general had the responsibility for enforcing charitable trusts on
behalf of and as the representative of the public, but there is no
authority for the proposition that the attorney general had any au-
thority over any church. It is doubtful that he did, since apparently
even chancery had no supervisory power over the Anglican church.58
Furthermore, the attorney general came forward with no authority
from the common law that churches were ever deemed to be or ever
impressed with a charitable or public trust.
C. The Case Law
Prior to the California cases decided in the past few years,59 no
case has ever held a church to be a public trust in the sense that the
attorney general asserts, that is, with assets held in public trust and
officers considered public trustees. Nor has any court either in the
United States or in England specifically ruled that a church is sub-
ject to attorney general supervision or that a church is subject to
the entire body of public trust law. In fact there is only one record-
ed case prior to 1979 of a California Attorney General suing a
church to protect it from the irregularities of a church official." In
that case, the church did not resist, so the attorney general's author-
ity was never tested. The only other case that involved the attorney
general in a church's affairs concerned the disposition of the subject
church's property upon dissolution."1 The attorney general's in-
tervention in that case was required by a statute 2 that made him a
56. Da Costa v. DePas, 1 Amb 228, 27 Eng. Rep. 150 (1754).
57. SCOTT, supra note 54, at § 371.
58. Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property,
75 HARV. L. REv. 1142, 1147 (1962), citing CRIPPS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW
RELATING TO THE CHURCH AND CLERGY 51, 65-66 (8th ed. 1937).
59. See notes 5-6, supra and accompanying text.
60. People v. Christ's Church of the Golden Rule, 79 Cal. App. 2d 858, 181
P.2d 49 (1947).
61. Metropolitan Baptist Church of Richmond, Inc. v. Younger, 48 Cal. App.
3d 850, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1975).
62. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9801 (West 1977).
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party to the dissolution proceedings of a corporation that "holds its
assets on any trust or is organized for a charitable purpose or pur-
poses." The cited case, however, is no authority for the proposition
that church property is held subject to or impressed with a public
trust. It merely reveals that when the legislature intends to involve
the attorney general with church procedures it does so clearly and
unequivocally.
The principal thrust of the public trust regulatory theory is to
categorize or classify all churches as public or charitable trusts so
that the whole body of law relating to such organizations can be ap-
plied to churches. It must be made clear that the words "charitable"
and "public" are both rather slippery. Each has at least two senses
and, as the courts have pointed out, both have been sloppily
applied."
For most purposes, a bequest or an institution is charitable if:
(1) It is made for a charitable purpose, and its aims and ac-
complishments are of a religious, educational, political, or general
social interest to mankind. This includes the alleviation of poverty
and the provision of health care, in short, anything considered be-
nevolent; and
(2) The ultimate recipients constitute either the community as
a whole or an unascertainable and indefinite portion of the public. 4
Thus, something can fail to be charitable in law for either of
two reasons: (1) the purpose of the bequest or institution is malevo-
lent or non-benevolent, 5 or (2) the beneficiary of the charity is not
the public, or a class so unascertainable or indefinite as to be con-
sidered the public, but rather is private.
63. On the word "charitable," see La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance
Mutuelle v. California Employment Comm'n, 56 Cal. App. 2d 534, 542, 133 P.2d 47, 51
(1943). On the word "public," see 14 C.J.S. Charities § 1(e) (1939), where "public" means
either the public at large or some substantial and indefinite portion of it. See also,
SCOTT, supra note 54, at § 375 ("It is a question of degree whether the class [of
beneficiaries] is large enough .. ")
64. In re Allen's Estate, 17 Cal. App. 3d 401, 408, 94 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651-52
(1971); Lynch v. Spillman, 67 Cal. 2d 251, 261, 431 P.2d 636, 642, 62 Cal. Rptr. 12, 18
(1967).
65. SCOTT, supra, note 54, at § 398.1, discusses the word "benevolent" and
takes it to mean purposes broader than those generally recognized by the courts as
"charitable." In this article, the word is used only to signal that the nature of a
charitable purpose-independent of the nature of the class of beneficiaries of that pur-
pose-is being discussed.
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Thus, the term "charitable" is the enemy of clear thinking, for
it sometimes includes the public quality of the class of beneficiaries
and sometimes refers only to the benevolent nature of the benefit
conferred. There are, after all, such things as private charitable
trusts (also a class into which churches do not fit), but judges have
not always kept the distinctions clear. Thus, the law is littered with
many unreasoned and ambiguous references categorizing churches
as "charitable" or as being "organized exclusively for charitable
purposes." It is uncontestable that religious benefits have always
been deemed to be of a worthy nature-and in the same class as
education and the alleviation of poverty and suffering. Yet the fact
that churches are always charitable in this limited sense of being
"benevolent" is no indication that churches cannot be or are not
private organizations." There are also myriad cases that speak of
the benefits that churches provide to the public-at-large, but no
amount of evidence that churches are trusts benefiting the public-at-
large incidentally can show that churches are trusts exclusively for
the public benefit.
It is well established that the terms "public trust" and
"charitable trust" are terms of art. They are also synonymous. 7
Happily, the fact that they are synonyms can lead to clarity. The
term "public trust" is preferable in this discussion because it is most
often the public vel non nature of church assets that is at issue.
Ultimately, a charitable trust or a public trust is merely a symbol
used to designate the creation of a fiduciary relationship imposing
obligations enforceable in equity."
There are two lines of reasoning to support the public trust
theory. The first, reduced to its essentials, would go something like
this: A church holds its assets in implied trust for its membership.
The membership of a church is a large, undefined and indefinite
class. When something is held in trust for such a class, it is a public
66. Cases where express trusts for religious purposes were not upheld as
charitable trusts because the class of beneficiaries was too narrow are collected in
SCOTT, supra note 54, at §371.6. "Thus in Cocks v. Manners, L.R. 12 Eq. 574 (1871) it
was held that a trust to aid in promoting the spiritual welfare of a group of nuns was
not a charitable purpose .... In Gilmore v. Coats, [1949] A.C. 426 money was given to
trustees in trust for the purpose of a Carmelite priory, a convent belonging to one of
the strictly cloistered and clearly contemplative orders of the Roman Catholic church,
with a gift over if the purposes were not charitable. It was held that the purposes
were not charitable." These cases make it clear that religious purposes are not always
public purposes and hence not always charitable purposes.
67. 14 C.J.S. Charities § l(c) n.27 (1939).
68. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 348 (1935).
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trust. The most serious problem with this argument is that it mis-
construes the nature of the trust in question. The implied trust is
not a charitable trust because its goal is not to carry out a benevo-
lent purpose and it does not affect any public interest. To under-
stand this, some history is needed.
There are cases holding that church assets are to be held in im-
plied trust."' However, the cases are not concerned with the chari-
table trust doctrine. Instead, the implied trusts in these cases were
created to deal with internal church property disputes, disputes into
which the courts were inevitably drawn. In deciding church dis-
putes, English courts traditionally distinguished between hierarchi-
cal churches and congregational churches. The necessity for making
the hierarchical/congregational distinction was first enunciated in
Craigdallie v. Aikman,0 wherein Lord Chancellor Eldon framed the
approach known as the implied trust doctrine. When a local congre-
gation that is part of a larger, hierarchical organization obtains
property, it does so in trust for the benefit and use of the religious
beliefs propounded by the religious organization existing at the time
of the gift. The implied trust imposed by the English court in Craig-
dallie was based upon the grantor's presumed intent to support the
beliefs and doctrines advanced by the church as then organized,
rather than to support any one local congregation. A natural ex-
tension of this doctrine was the "departure from doctrine" theory. 1
If the larger organization departed in any way from the doctrines
and beliefs in existence at the time of the affiliation of the local
church, the trust was violated and the larger church no longer had
any claim to the property held by the local congregation. A court
was therefore directly involved in determining the religious doctrine
and beliefs espoused at affiliation and those held when the con-
troversy arose.
The United States Supreme Court essentially adopted the
English implied trust theory.7 2 However, as church property dis-
putes grew in number, courts increasingly became involved in strict-
ly ecclesiastical disputes. Many states, California among them,
departed from the rule that church assets were held in implied trust
for the mother church, and adopted a rule that, in the absence of an
69. See notes 70-73 infra and accompanying text.
70. 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (1813).
71. See, e.g., Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210
U.S. 296 (1908); Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846 (1927); Blanc v. Alsbury, 63 Tex.
489 (1885).
72. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (8 Wall) 679 (1872).
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express corporate charter provision to the contrary, church assets
were held in implied trust for the membership of the individual con-
gregations.7 3 In the event of a dispute with the mother church, the
majority of the local congregation would retain title and control of
the assets.
These property dispute cases are the only instances where
church assets have been found to be impressed with a trust restric-
tion. Only for the limited purpose of deciding an internal church
dispute do the courts resort to the legal fiction of an implied trust
and it is used solely for the purpose of divining the intent of some
hypothetical donor. Thus, it is evident that this type of implied trust
cannot be deemed charitable or public for at least three reasons.
First, it is a dispute of a distinctly private character, the kind of ec-
clesiastical dispute the courts generally avoid. Second, the trust
restriction to be imposed has nothing to do with benefiting the pub-
lic. Third, the purpose of the trust is non benevolent. While it may
be involved with religion, it asks that the church use its assets for
the furtherance of one religious group or belief as against another.
Neither the public nor the court would consider this a charitable
aim or purpose. Any arguments in support of the public trust theory
that rely on the implied trust doctrine are therefore without legal
basis.
However, there is a second line of reasoning to support the
public trust theory that does not refer to the implied trust doctrine
at all. This argument is that churches are organized exclusively for
religious and charitable purposes and churches exist for the benefit
of the general public. Public trusts are exclusively for charitable
purposes and for the benefit of the public. Therefore, churches
should be deemed by the court to be charitable public trusts holding
their assets in trust for the general public.
There are many difficulties here, the first being that the sense
in which the term "charitable" is being used is not clear. Thus,
churches are proved to be public only by definition. Just as it is
clear that churches undeniably are charitable in one sense, they
undeniably are not charitable in another. In law, the purposes of a
corporation are determined by looking first to the corporate charter.
It would be an odd church that did not list among its purposes the
73. Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Church of Los Angeles, 119 Cal. 477, 483,
51 P. 841, 844 (1897); Presbytery of Riverside v. Community Church of Palm Springs,
89 Cal. App. 3d 910, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979); Christian Church of Vacaville v. Crystal,
78 Cal. App. 1, 9, 247 P. 605, 608 (1926).
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ministering to the spiritual needs of its members and congregants.
This is most often the primary purpose of a church. In the legal
world of corporate charters, it is always a purpose at least of equal
importance with all others. The law is clear that an organization
with just one substantial private purpose is not a charity or a chari-
table trust or "charitable" in the complete legal sense of conducting
a benevolent purpose exclusively for the benefit of the public.
Numerous cases involving lodges, fraternal organizations, mutual
hospital societies, and other mutual benefit societies make this cer-
tain. 4 To be deemed charitable for the purpose of the law of public
trusts, the organization must have exclusively charitable, i.e. exclu-
sively public, purposes. An organization that has mixed public and
private purposes or any substantial private purpose is not consi-
dered a charity. Unless an organization is obligated by law or its
own charter to benefit only the public, instead of being able to
choose among its various corporate purposes, then no court of equi-
ty can enforce a trust for the benefit of the public because there is
none to enforce. The fact is that the assets of a church are held
beneficially by the corporation to do with as it pleases consistent
with its corporate purposes. The church may legally limit its activ-
ities and the use of its assets to the private religious purposes of its
members. Furthermore, common sense suggests that those who con-
tribute to the collection plate would recognize this fact. Donors are
fully aware that a church is not a public charity and that the general
public will benefit only incidentally and secondarily from their dona-
tions. A charitable trust, like an express private trust, is created
only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a trust."5
The donor's intent to benefit only the general public, which is the
fundamental prerequisite for the impressing of a public trust, is ab-
sent when church members contribute to a church. Thus, churches
are always "charitable" in that they are benevolent but never "chari-
table" in that they always have a substantial private aspect.
74. Lynch v. Spillman, 67 Cal. 2d 251, 431 P.2d 636, 62 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1967); In
re Los Angeles County Pioneer Soc'y, 40 Cal. 2d 852, 257 P.2d 1 (1953); Pacific Home v.
County of Los Angeles, 41 Cal. 2d 844, 264 P.2d 539 (1953); In re Allen's Estate, 17 Cal.
App. 3d 401, 94 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971); La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle v.
California Employment Comm'n, 56 Cal. App. 2d 534, 133 P.2d 47 (1943).
The precise framing of the rule is that a substantial private purpose, as opposed to an
incidental private purpose, will destroy the charitable nature of an organization. The
word "exclusive" therefore does have some flexibility in the law. However, if a church
has any private purpose, it is certainly a substantial and not an incidental one. For
purposes of argument, to say that an organization must be "primarily" public in order
to be charitable would lead only to unnecessary confusion. Two-valued logic is here re-
tained for the sake of simplified analysis.
75. SCOTT, supra note 54, at § 351.
1981]
Jackson: Socialized Religion: California's Public Trust Theory
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
210 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
If one is absolutely determined to make churches into public
charities, it can be done simply by definition. By emphasizing that
churches are "charitable" within the "legal" meaning given to the
term, the private, selfish, non-public aspect of a church can be made
to disappear. The question of whether or not the only intended reci-
pients of a church's benevolence are the public successfully has been
begged. The issue in question has been assumed to be true for the
purpose of proving it to be true. This is exactly what the probate
courts did for many years in a line of "pseudo-mortmain" cases.
There were formerly on the books in California and other
states a group of statutes akin to the old English mortmain laws
which put certain conditions, restrictions, and limitations on be-
quests to charitable organizations. Briefly, the laws declared be-
quests to charity void if a will was drawn within thirty days of
death by a testator survived by certain designated relatives. Where
the will of such a testator was made thirty days or more prior to
death, the charitable bequests were valid only to the extent that
they collectively did not exceed one-third of the decedent's estate.
The probate courts were asked to determine whether or not a be-
quest was "charitable" by deciding if the recipient was "charitable."
Nothing crucial turned on these rulings except that, in a very limit-
ed number of instances, organizations deemed "charitable" would
not receive an attempted bequest. The bequest would go to the do-
nor's kin. Churches were not treated as public trusts and no public
trust restrictions followed from these rulings. Churches have never
been subject to the body of public trust law.
The express intent of the mortmain statutes was to limit the
flow of lands and funds to the church and to charity to prevent such
assets from losing their taxable character. The intent of the Califor-
nia statutes was to favor heirs-at-law as against excessive or unrea-
soned gifts to charity. Not surprisingly, many organizations, especi-
ally churches, were swept into the rubric of "charitability" for the
purpose of these statutes. These musty relics of old law form the
vast majority of cases on which the attorney general relies to prove
that there is no difference between a church and a public charity."6
It was not necessary for the probate courts to accord churches
"charitable" status in such a definitional fashion, since the result in
those cases was probably correct and could have been reached in a
76. In re Lubin's Estate, 186 Cal. 326, 329, 199 P. 15, 16 (1921); In re Hamil-
ton's Estate, 181 Cal. 758, 186 P. 587 (1919); In re Moore's Estate, 219 Cal. App. 2d 737,
33 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1963).
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more logical manner. The evil the legislature sought to guard
against was overzealous fundraising, especially at a time when the
donor was in extremis. The most likely overreachers at such a time
would probably be the moribund's religious brethren, and the legis-
lature no doubt intended that churches be included in the statute.
Indeed, the language of former Probate Code §41 (and its predeces-
sor Civil Code §131) defeated bequests "to any charitable or benevo-
lent society or corporation." The result of including churches could
have been accomplished simply by insisting that churches were be-
nevolent or had at least charitable purposes as well as private ones.
Instead, the result was achieved by adopting a very lax standard or
rule as to the public benefit requirement, similar to the rule in the
case of express trusts for religious purposes.
Express trusts will fail and the assets go to the donor's heirs if
there is no definite beneficiary to enforce the trust or if it violates
the Rule Against Perpetuities-unless the trust can be upheld as
charitable.
A trust will not be upheld as charitable unless the accom-
plishment of the purposes of the trust is of benefit or sup-
posed benefit to the community. . . . It is a question of
degree whether the class is large enough to make the per-
formance of the trust of sufficient benefit to the communi-
ty so that it will be upheld as a charitable trust. If the
purpose of the trust is to relieve poverty, promote educa-
tion, advance religion or protect health, the class need not
be as broad as it must be when the benefits to be confer-
red have no relation to any of these purposes.77
Thus, a trust may be a valid charitable trust for the advancement
of religion even though the persons who are to benefit are limited in
number. 8 The California formulation of this broad rule adopted by
the probate courts was that a religious organization was to be deem-
ed charitable so long as it was "not strictly private,"79 or so long as
its benefits were not expressly and solely limited to its immediate
membership."
This is not the rule when the assets of a corporation are im-
pressed with a public trust. Then the strict rule is applied. To be
77. SCOTT, supra note 54, at § 375.
78. Id. at § 375.1.
79. In re Graham's Estate, 63 Cal. App. 41, 44, 218 P. 84, 85 (1923).
80. In re Lubin's Estate, 186 Cal. at 329, 199 P. at 16.
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"charitable," the organization must be organized solely for chari-
table purposes. Its purposes must be strictly public or at least only
collaterally or incidentally private."
All of these cases do no more than support the proposition that
churches are by law, always of some incidental benefit to the public
or, in the alternative, have a public purpose. They cannot support
the proposition that churches have exclusively public purposes or
beneficiaries.
In In re Estate of Lubin,"' the court begged the questions
whether a church has a substantial private purpose and whether the
public is the sole beneficiary of church assets by reaching the ambig-
uous conclusion that churches exist "for the public benefit." The
court commenced by defining a small Jewish congregation as chari-
table within the legal meaning of the term, giving no thought to the
possibility that it was shifting the definition of the term. It applied
the broad rule whereby to avoid "charitability," an organization
would have to limit its benefits strictly to its membership. It then
examined the synagogue's articles and concluded that the organiza-
tion existed for the benefit of "all of like faith," a class large and in-
determinate enough to constitute the public. In reaching that conclu-
sion, the court simply ignored a cardinal rule of trusts that not
every party who may benefit from the operation of a trust is to be
regarded as a beneficiary. If the trust operates only incidentally to
benefit a person, he is not a beneficiary and cannot enforce rights
thereunder." Thus, the organization was held to be a charity exist-
ing for the benefit of the incidental beneficiaries (the public) and the
direct beneficiaries (the congregation) were simply ignored by lump-
ing them with "all of like faith."
The California courts have dealt with these errors in a very
practical and common sense way. The courts simply abandon any
attempt to define categorically any given organization or class of or-
ganizations as "charitable." The courts now hold, quite pragmatically,
that "[i]f used in a statute or legal instrument, the word ["charity"]
must be defined in conformity with the purpose or intention of the
lawmakers or the parties to the instrument."8
81. See note 70 supra.
82. 186 Cal. 326, __ 199 P. 15, 16 (1921).
83. SCOTT, supra note 54, at § 126.
84. La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle v. California Employment
Comm'n, 56 Cal. App. 2d 534, 542, 543, 133 P.2d 47, 51 (1943) ("An institution may be
declared 'charitable' for the purpose of a bequest or a tort action, but 'non-charitable'
for the purpose of taxation"). The Societe Francaise court even went on to specifically
limit the Lubin standard of what constitutes a public charity to the law of bequests.
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Citing these cases to prove that a church exists for the benefit
of the public closes a circle of argument. The probate courts used a
definition of "charitable" that included the public nature of the
beneficiary to prove that a church always has a public beneficiary.
Under the public trust theory, these statements are used to prove
that a church fulfills the full legal requirements of being
"charitable" and having no private beneficiaries. In neither case
were church charters examined to discover whether a substantial
private purpose existed. The state can only assert that a church can-
not have a private purpose as a matter of law. However, an organi-
zation can have no private purpose as a matter of law if, and only if,
it is a public charity. An organization can only be a public charity if
its stated purposes negate any substantial private interest, and the
courts on which the state relies never posed this question to them-
selves in deciding whether churches were "charitable" or "for the
public benefit". Ultimately, the state is trying to prove that an
organization that is exclusively benevolent is ipso facto a public
trust by definition.
A further proposition might be propounded by the state that
church membership forms a class so large and indefinite that it is a
public class. Therefore, an organization for the benefit of church
members is a public organization. This argument has innumerable
difficulties of a constitutional nature since it forms a prohibited
religious class and then equates that class with the public. It also
discriminates between churches and other groups, such as fraternal
organizations and mutual benefit societies, on the basis of religion in
violation of the equal protection clause.
Finally, the attorney general makes much of the necessity for
his right to supervise churches and protect the public interest there-
in. This argument is based on the flawed assumption that the
public's interest is a proprietary one, calling for the special enforce-
ment remedies provided by classifying churches as charitable trusts.
The public does have an interest in churches. However, that interest
is indirect, incidental, and secondary, no more and no less than the
public's interest in all other corporations and private associations.
As such, it is adequately protected through the enforcement of the
criminal law.
D. The Tax Exemption Argument
As the last independent justification for his position the attor-
ney general argues that the people of the state should be deemed
the beneficial owners of churches because churches are tax-exempt
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and therefore publicly supported. This contention assumes that a
tax-exemption is a subsidy that gives the government some recip-
rocal right. This "tax expenditure" concept has enjoyed a certain
vogue in recent years, but does not find legal support. The Supreme
Court of the United States has responded directly to this argument
by declaring "[tihe grant of tax-exemption is not sponsorship since
the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches
but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
state."85
CONCLUSION
California's public trust theory is unsupported by statute, com-
mon law, or case law. Further, the premise of public ownership and
control of the means of worship violates fundamental constitutional
guarantees, primarily the first amendment guarantee of freedom of
religion.
The California trial courts' acceptance of the public trust doc-
trine, as proposed by the attorney general, is based on a mispercep-
tion of the characteristics of a church as a charitable organization. A
public trust, enforceable by the attorney general, is both exclusively
charitable and exclusively public. Although churches are exclusively
charitable, in the sense of benevolence, they are not exclusively
public, since one of their purposes is to benefit their members. Thus,
by definition, churches are not public trusts.
However, regardless of attempts to justify the public trust doc-
trine by appeal to authority on related issues, it is clear that the
state's incursion into the affairs of a church is a blatant violation of
the Constitution that cannot withstand further judicial scrutiny.
85. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
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